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LANDMARK CASES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, edited 
by Jose Bellido. Hart Publishing, 2017.  pp. xxv + 381, Hardcover, $108.   
Reviewed by Maurizio Borghi 
Centre for Intellectual Property Policy & Management (CIPPM), 
Bournemouth University 
mborghi@bournemouth.ac.uk 
Intellectual property is probably one of the most contentious fields of 
contemporary legal studies, but it is at the same time, to a large extent, a 
discipline still in search of identity. Not surprisingly, the historical and 
theoretical foundations of intellectual property have attracted increasing 
attention from researchers, within and beyond the boundaries of law. Not more 
than fifteen years ago, the essential bibliography on copyright history in 
English language could have been wrapped up in one single footnote, and a 
long footnote could have accommodated the main literature on the history of 
all intellectual property rights as such. This is certainly no longer the case 
today. Historical research on the legal, theoretical, and social foundations of 
intellectual property has proliferated in many directions. It has transformed 
from an ancillary subject at the periphery of the intellectual property debate 
into one that attracts the foremost scholars in the field. 
The book LANDMARK CASES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, 
edited by Jose Bellido, inscribes itself into this fertile ground of scholarship. It 
stands out, first of all, for the quality of the contributors, who are authors of 
some of the most authoritative and most-cited works on intellectual property 
history. Although first-hand research into litigation has been part and parcel of 
this field for a long time, not many works have systematically collected 
original contributions along the common thread of case law analysis. The most 
significant precedent in this genre is probably the remarkable collection of 
essays on leading US cases edited by Jane Ginsburg and Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss over a decade ago.1 
The interpretation of intellectual property history through the lenses of 
institutional and commercial practices, such as licensing and litigation 
strategies, is one of the distinctive features of Jose Bellido’s scholarship.2 The 
“case studies” methodology that defines this book shares the same rationale, 
namely – as Bellido puts it in his chapter – that “there is much to be gained in 
looking at the background of the dispute, its emergence, and how it is litigated 
by the protagonists.” (p. 206).  
The thirteen cases selected for this book are all by British courts, with one 
exception for a decision coming from the European Court of Justice. The time 
span starts in the 1600s, when patents were still called “monopolies” and 
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copyright was not yet even a word, and ends in the present days, under the 
growing influence of European Union law (still formally binding in the United 
Kingdom at the moment of writing this review). What makes the selected 
cases landmarks in intellectual property law? 
As acknowledged by Jose Bellido in his preface, there are a number of reasons 
why a particular legal dispute marks an historical turning-point. In the most 
classical sense, it is so because of the disputes’ enduring legacy as legal 
precedent, typically due to the way in which a particular legal principle has 
been established. Alternatively, the landmark quality may depend on the 
matter around which the controversy arose, for example when a new 
technology or business practice challenges established norms. In a more 
general sense, a case stands out if it has something crucial to say that goes 
beyond the facts of the litigation, and perhaps also beyond the boundaries of 
law. 
A glance at the table of contents reveals that the choice of cases corresponds 
only partially to the typical reading list of IP courses. Evidently, the editor and 
the contributors were less preoccupied with ticking the boxes of an ideal list 
than to make an original and unique contribution to scholarship. There are 
typically two ways of advancing knowledge and understanding in a legal 
discipline through case studies: either you raise the attention to cases that have 
not yet received adequate consideration, or you tackle well-known cases from 
a fresh perspective. The book does both of these things. On the one side, it 
challenges the acquired assumptions on classical authorities and, on the other, 
it expands the notional catalogue of benchmark cases by pointing to 
“unorthodox” and less researched authorities. 
Taken as a whole, these thirteen cases traversing five centuries of British 
history tell a story with many layers of meaning. First, and more obviously, 
there is a story of legal disputes and litigation, with their tangled backgrounds 
of business and personal micro-histories that frequently intertwine with the 
broader societal, cultural, and economic dimensions. This story entails also a 
narrative of legal strategies adopted by counsels, and how these strategies 
succeeded or failed, thereby influencing the development of the discipline. On 
another level, this same litigation describes a discipline in search of identity: 
different legal threads with diverse statutory or common law origins that only 
at a very late stage converge under the common umbrella construct of 
“intellectual property”. This narrative seems to suggest that such convergence 
is not just the outcome of contingent factual circumstances, but unfolds a 
pattern that is deeply entrenched in the specific British legal tradition. Indeed, 
it is in this tradition that “property” emerged more prominently as the common 
thread that unites interests as diverse as those of authors, inventors, and trade 
mark owners. In this connection, there is at least another layer of meaning, 
which remains largely implicit in the book: it is the story of how different 
legal traditions, across the world, have shaped the fundamental principles of 
the discipline and how these traditions have influenced each other over the 
years. 
The book is a treasure trove of insights into all of these layers. It begins by 
revisiting the impact of early statutory law on “monopolies”, with Sean 
Bottomley’s enlightening reading of Mansell v Bunger (1626), and then 
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embarks in a long epistemological journey with a number of direct and 
indirect cross-references. 
In the course of this journey, the book is not afraid of reopening some of the 
most prominent “dossiers” of intellectual property history and theory. One of 
these is the 18th Century’s “literary property debate”, revolving around the 
question of whether there is an authors’ property right protected at common 
law that precedes and exceeds the limited right created by the statute. Because 
of its vast implications on the origin, purpose, and limits of copyright, the 
question continues to attract attention from copyright historians and theorists 
alike.3 The chapter by H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui on Stationers v Seymour 
(1677) contributes to a better understanding of the debate. Based on the 
analysis of newly discovered manuscript reports and records, Gómez-
Arostegui makes a convincing case that the reliance on this precedent by 
supporters of the subsistence of a common law intangible right vested in 
authors was by no means wrong. “In short,” Gómez-Arostegui tells us, “a 
number of lawyers and judges in the late seventeenth century believed that an 
author’s right in literary property was a plausible basis for argument, even 
though no statue expressly mentioned authors’ rights before 1710.” (p. 54). 
This means that “the notion of an antecedent [authors’] right at common law 
was not fanciful or novel.” (p. 54). 
To be sure, this finding does not change the fact that the notion of a perpetual 
authors’ right at common-law, and the related narrative of the author as 
proprietor of a transferable object of property, was largely instrumental to the 
interests of publishers, to whom the alleged right could be transferred.4 This 
story, which has been elsewhere described as the “latent story about 
commodification of knowledge”,5 seems to be confirmed by the other 
copyright cases discussed in the book. Indeed, perhaps not surprisingly, in 
none of these cases are the authors’ personal interests the driving cause or the 
main issue at stake. 
The argument developed in Gómez-Arostegui’s chapter is echoed in Barbara 
Lauriat’s discussion of a later case, widely acknowledged as seminal in Anglo-
American copyright law, namely the House of Lords decision in Walter v 
Lane (1900). The case revolved around newspaper reports of oral speeches. 
Although the focus was on copyright subsistence in these reports, the question 
of whether oral speeches as such attract common law copyright was at the 
background of the litigation. Lauriat’s thorough reconstruction of the facts 
seems to suggest that the litigation may not have happened, should the author 
of the speeches (the Earl of Rosebery) not have wrongly assumed that he did 
not own any copyright to assert against Lane to prevent the publication of his 
addresses. Yet the chapter makes an even more important point, which sheds 
new light into the persisting legacy of this case as an authority for the British 
concept of originality. This authority, argues Lauriat, is questionable, not 
because of its incompatibility with the modern, “higher” standard developed at 
the European level, but because it is not to be regarded as a case on originality 
in the first place. It is, rather, a case on authorship. The teaching of the case is 
not that reports qualify as “original” literary works, but that reports attract 
copyright despite not being original works of authorship – and this is because 
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“there was nothing in the statute that suggested only an ‘original composition’ 
would gain copyright protection.” (p. 168). 
The divorce between authors’ interests and the actual operation of copyright 
law is perhaps another “latent history” that the book helps unveil. In fact, the 
dispute in Walter v Lane was carried out in complete disregard of the author’s 
reluctance to be dragged into a lawsuit. In Sayer v Moore (1785), the first of a 
series of cases on alleged copyright infringement in maps and charts 
thoroughly discussed by Isabella Alexander (pp. 59-86), cartographers played 
a major role, but only as expert witnesses of the court. The representation of 
the author of the Popeye comic strip and his heir is a controversial aspect of 
King Feature Syndicate (1940), as presented by Jose Bellido. This case is best 
remembered for the emergence of copyright “as an economic and social 
platform for licensing and merchandising activities” where syndication, and 
not authorship, was “the basis of the intangible property rights.”(p. 230). 
There is another landmark element in the King Feature case, namely the role 
played by the counsel’s strategy in pursuing a test case with very uncertain 
results. The choice of the court in which to bring proceedings is a distinctive 
point of interest in Day v Day, Day and Martin (1816), a litigation that 
“signalled a shift in trademark enforcement practice.” (p. 87) and that forms 
the basis of Lionel Bently’s insightful discussion of early trademark history. 
One century later, in R v Johnstone (2003), a case involving counterfeited 
CDs, the plaintiff’s counsel sued on trade mark infringement grounds, instead 
on the more logical copyright infringement grounds, because of the stronger 
criminal sanctions then available under the Trade Marks Act of 1994. In this 
case, however, the strategy did not pay off, as the House of Lords famously 
concluded that the use of registered trademarks such as “Bon Jovi” in the front 
cover of bootlegged CDs was not a “use as a trade mark”. In her analysis, 
Elena Cooper focuses on a further element of interest of this ruling, namely 
the relationship between civil and criminal law in intellectual property, and 
explains why the court rightly refrained from establishing “closer analogies 
between intellectual property crime and the law of theft.” (p. 343).  
The precedent set by R v Johnston as to the trade mark function had short life 
due to the subsequent jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, whose 
landmark ruling on functionality in Lego Juris v OHIM (2010) is the focus of 
the last chapter of the book. Alain Pottage contextualizes the case on the 
background of the aggressive strategy pursued by the Danish company to 
extend its expired patent rights. “The [Lego] brick is so thoroughly implicated 
in the history of intellectual property law – Pottage tells us – that one could 
imagine taking it as the vehicle of an engaging and expansive course in 
intellectual property law” (p. 347). Pottage takes the brick as a vehicle for the 
understanding of how the nature and operation of trade mark law has evolved 
at the interface between EU and national jurisprudence. 
However, the area of intellectual property where British jurisprudence has 
engaged more intensively with doctrines and principles from other European 
traditions is probably patent law. The three chapters on the modern patent 
system cover systematically the foundational elements of the law, namely 
subject matter qualification, obviousness, and construction of the scope of the 
claims. The latter is discussed extensively in Seymour Mauskopf’s chapter on 
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Nobel Explosives Company v Anderson (1894), which digs critically into the 
origin of the British approach to claim interpretation. The contentious issue of 
subject matter eligibility is tackled by Brad Sherman with reference to Slee & 
Harris’s Application (1966), one of the earliest decisions on computer 
programs. Another controversial subject matter, biotech inventions, is at the 
centre stage of Biogen v Medeva (1996). Luke McDonagh provides a critical 
re-reading Lord Hoffmann’s judgment on obviousness and sufficiency in the 
context of the emergence of a disruptive technology. 
The book pays the right tribute to common-law intellectual property in two of 
its chapters. Hazel Carty presents an elegant and articulated analysis of 
Spalding v Gamage (1915), the leading authority on the law of passing-off. 
The widespread legacy of Coco v Clark (1969) for the law of breach of 
confidence is discussed in Tanya Aplin’s chapter. The surprising influence of 
this lower court decision across different jurisdictions is examined by a 
systematic quantitative and qualitative analysis of citations, which provides 
remarkable insights into the many trajectories followed by this legacy. 
In its diversity of approaches, directions, and methodologies, the book offers a 
thoughtful opportunity to rethink the foundations of intellectual property, as 
well as its purpose and future. It will be an indispensable work of reference for 
research in the years to come. 
 
ENDNOTES 
                                                          
1INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES, Jane C. Ginsburg and Rochelle 
Cooper Dreyfuss, eds. (Foundation Press, 2006). 
2See e.g. Jose Bellido and Fiona Macmillan, Music Copyright after 
Collectivisation, I.P.Q. 231-246 (2016); Jose Bellido and Kathy Bowrey, From 
the Author to the Proprietor: Newspaper Copyright and The Times (1842-
1956), 6 J. of Media Law, 206-233 (2014); Jose Bellido, Codified Anxieties: 
Literary Copyright in Mid-Nineteenth Century Spain, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT LAW, Isabella 
Alexander and H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, eds. (Edward Elgar, 2016), 423-
443. 
3See in particular Mark Rose, AUTHORS AND OWNERS. THE 
INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (Harvard University Press, 1993), 92-101; 
Brad Sherman and Lionel Bently, THE MAKING OF MODERN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 9-
19; Ronan Deazley, RETHINKING COPYRIGHT: HISTORY, THEORY, 
LANGUAGE (Edward Elgar, 2006), 16-25; Abraham Drassinower, WHAT’S 
WRONG WITH COPYING? (Harvard University Press, 2015), 152-155. 
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5Abraham Drassinower, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING?, 155. 
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PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS: TOWARD A 
GLOBAL CONSENSUS, edited by C. Bradford Biddle, Jorge. L. 
Contreras, Brian J. Love, and Norman V. Siebrasse. Cambridge University 
Press, 2019.  pp. xxxiii + 344, Hardcover, $125, and Open Access.   
Reviewed by Bernard Chao 
University of Denver 
Sturm College of Law 
bchao@law.du.edu  
Twenty leading scholars from around the world worked on the International 
Patent Remedies for Complex Products (“INPRECOMP”) project.  One of the 
fruits of this project is the book entitled PATENT REMEDIES AND 
COMPLEX PRODUCTS: TOWARD A GLOBAL CONSENSUS.  The title 
reveals the book and indeed the project’s aspirations: “to seek international 
consensus on issues affecting remedies in the context of complex products” 
(p.xxvii).  The participants undoubtedly understood that this lofty goal was 
overly ambitious.   In this complex global system, there are too many diverse 
viewpoints and agendas to achieve real consensus.  Nonetheless, the authors 
have done an admirable job describing some of the most important issues in 
patent remedies law and setting forth different approaches countries have used 
to address these issues. 
The book frames the problems that complex products pose by initially noting, 
“[w]e no longer live in a world of simple inventions where the patented 
technology provides most, if not all, of the value of an end product” (p.xxi). A 
single end product (e.g., smartphone) may contain thousands of technologies 
that are covered by “tens or even hundreds of thousands of individuals patents 
issued by patent offices across the globe” (p.1). These patent “thickets” make 
it immensely difficult to calibrate patent remedies in way that satisfies two 
competing interests: 1) incentivizing invention by adequately compensating 
patent holders, and 2) promoting follow-on innovation.  If the law provides too 
weak a set of remedies, it will under incentivize invention.1  On the other 
hand, making remedies too powerful can stifle follow on innovation. 2   The 
challenge for policymakers and judges is determining where to draw the 
different lines.  
PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS divides the issues into 
seven chapters.  The first four chapters discuss specific remedies, namely: 
“Reasonable Royalties”, “Lost Profit and Disgorgement”, “Enhanced 
Damages, Litigation Cost Recovery, and Interest”, and “Injunctive Relief”.  
The next three chapters then cover issues that makes this first set of topics 
even more complicated: “The Effect of FRAND Commitments on Patent 
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Remedies”, “The Effect of Competition Law on Patent Remedies” and 
“Holdout, Holdup and Royalty Stacking: A Review of the Literature.”   
The book is well suited for readers of varying levels of expertise and patience.  
For those seeking bottom line answers, the book begins with a helpful 
“Executive Summary” that briefly summarizes the different chapter’s principal 
recommendations.  Each chapter starts by introducing fundamental concepts 
associated with the topic.  The chapters then delve into many of the nuances 
associated with each topic.  In many cases, the deeper dive describes issues 
that even some experts may not have considered.  By discussing a sample of 
relevant examples, this review seeks to illustrate both the breadth and depth of 
the book’s coverage.  Indeed, PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX 
PRODUCTS is currently the most comprehensive source of information about 
how patent remedies law is applied to modern complex products.   
U.S stakeholders will want to pay special attention to the chapter on 
reasonable royalties.  Since 2010, roughly 82% of patent cases that awarded 
damages included reasonable royalty awards.3  Chapter 1 provides a wholistic 
treatment of the topic.  It starts by providing a brief look at the numbers by 
highlighting studies that discuss how often reasonable royalty awards are 
awarded and what average awards are in the United States (different studies 
suggest that the range may be from $3.5 to $5.8 million) (pp.6-7).  Although 
less data is available outside the United States, we still learn that awards are 
smaller in Japan (only 5 cases exceeded $1.7 million over a fourteen-year 
period) and rarer in China.  The Chapter also briefly explores the theoretical 
justifications for awarding reasonable royalties and the principal approaches 
for calculating them.  Of course, there is the discussion of the fifteen Georgia 
Pacific factors and its many failings.    
But PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS is not merely a 
descriptive view of the law, the authors make recommendations.  Like others 
have done before, Chapter 1 suggests narrowing the number of factors that 
juries consider.4 In their variation of this reform, the focus is on: 1) 
determining incremental value, 2) assessing market evidence, and 3) then 
using the two prior steps as checks against each other.  I am particularly 
heartened by two aspects of the discussion.   
First, when Chapter 1 describes incremental value, it does not assume that the 
entire value of a product is made up by the various patents that cover the 
product.  The Chapter acknowledges that taking a product to market requires 
“manufacturing, distribution, marketing, process refinement . . ..” and 
concludes that a royalty should reflect “compensation to the party who made 
the investments and shouldered the risks related to these ancillary services” 
(p.24) 5 This is a nuance that courts can overlook, and it is important to remind 
everyone that it is not just about patents.  
Second, I am delighted that there is also a discussion of cognitive bias in 
Chapter 1.  When explaining the justifications for the entire market value rule 
and requiring royalties to be based on the smallest saleable unit, the authors 
discuss anchoring – the tendency to give undue weight to the first number they 
encounter (p.43).  Law and psychology studies have repeatedly shown that 
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people are subject to a variety of such cognitive biases.  These insights have 
important implications in many legal contexts, and patent law is no exception. 
Patent juries literally make billion-dollar decisions. Policymakers and 
practicing attorneys need to understand how juries think.  For example, my 
own recent mock jury study with Roderick O’Dorisio revealed that juries often 
use damages to punish companies even when they are instructed to award 
compensatory damages.6 Insights like these can help courts and policymakers 
calibrate new remedy policies that takes these heuristics into account.    
Chapters 2-4 provide a similar treatment of lost profits, enhanced damages, 
and injunctions.  For all three topics, the book provides a good baseline 
description of the doctrine, including some discussion of jurisdictions outside 
the United States. Then each chapter discusses some important nuances and 
provides a few recommendations. For the most part, these descriptions are 
extremely informative and provide a fair treatment of the law.  And although I 
do not always agree with the recommendations, they are all certainly worthy 
of serious discussion. 
My primary disagreement with the book concerns Chapter 3’s 
recommendations on the treatment of unpatented goods and apportionment.  
The chapter advocates for legal rules that award lost profits associated with the 
sale of unpatented goods so long as the patentee can show causation.  The 
chapter also endorses Mentor Graphics v. Eve USA, a Federal Circuit decision 
rejecting the idea of apportioning lost profits.7  At its core, both of these 
recommendations reflect what Ted Sichleman has called “make-whole” 
remedies and they are controversial.  Scholarship by Sichelman, Eric Bensen, 
Amy Landers, Mark Lemley and myself have all staked out positions that 
seem inconsistent with Chapter 3’s view on lost profits.8  In one form or 
another, we have all argued that rents should be split between initial 
innovators and later follow-on innovators.  These views are fundamentally 
inconsistent with the idea of basing remedies purely on “but for” causation, 
the justification Chapter 3 relies on in making its recommendations.  While 
this portion of Chapter 3 certainly has its own advocates (including ample 
precedent), I wish the book had at least acknowledged that the issue is more 
controversial than the authors seem to suggest.9  
I found the other parts of PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX 
PRODUCTS less objectionable and more helpful.  Chapter 5 was particularly 
informative.  It discusses the effect that FRAND (fair reasonable and non-
discriminatory) commitments have on remedies for standards-essential patents 
(“SEPs”).  Early on, Chapter 5 sketches out to how to determine royalty rates 
using a “top down” approach, an approach that is quite different than the 
“bottom up” reasonable royalty calculation that most U.S. patent experts are 
familiar with.  The top down approach begins by determining the aggregate 
royalty burden that a standard should bear.  It then seeks to find the particular 
portion of that royalty that individual SEPs should receive.  Although the top 
down approach appears to have only been used in the SEP context, it seems 
that courts may want to consider borrowing aspects of this approach for any 
product covered by a large number of patents.    
The IP Law Book Review 9 
 
Perhaps because FRAND commitments have no borders, Chapter 5 explores 
international law in greater depth than some of the other chapters. There are 
discussions of several relevant international FRAND decisions including the 
Court of Justice of the European Union’s landmark decision in Huawei v. 
ZTE.10 Huawei v. ZTE describes the procedural steps that a SEP holder must 
follow if it wishes to seek an injunction against an unlicensed implementer 
without violating European Competition law.   Chapter 5 also provides an 
appendix that summarizes how different the laws of different countries assess 
monetary FRAND damages.  The appendix includes a discussion of the laws 
of Germany, Switzerland, Korea, Japan, and China. Importantly, the entire 
book (including the Appendix) provides citations to source material so that the 
reader can research specific topics in greater depth.  Because the implications 
of a FRAND commitment is probably one of the least well-developed areas of 
patent remedies, Chapter 5 probably has the most potential to educate and 
influence policymakers and judges.  
Of course, these are just a few of the many issues covered by PATENT 
REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS.  In short, for both practicing 
attorneys and policymakers interested in how patent remedies should and do 
work for complex products, PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX 
PRODUCTS is an excellent book with a wealth of helpful information.  
ENDNOTES 
                                                          
1 See generally Adam B. Jaffe, et al, eds., , Navigating the Patent Thicket: 
Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, And Standard Setting, in Vol. 1 INNOVATION 
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8 Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 Tex. 
L.Rev.517 (2014) (arguing that “make- whole” remedies are ill suited for 
patent law); Eric E. Bensen, Apportionment of Lost Profits in Contemporary 
Damages Cases, 10 Va. J.L. & Tech. 1 (2005) (making the historical case for 
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UNITED STATES V. APPLE: COMPETITION IN AMERICA, by Chris 
Sagers. Harvard University Press, 2019.  pp. 336, Hardcover, $29.95.   
Reviewed by Shubha Ghosh 
Syracuse University 
College of Law 
Sghosh01@law.syr.edu  
That Professor Sagers has written an ambitious book is demonstrated in its 
subtitle. “Competition in America” covers a lot of ground, from the stock 
market to the football field. Competition fuels America, moving it forward. 
But competition also can slam on the brakes suddenly and frighteningly, as 
with deep economic downturns or failures to respond to crises, like a 
pandemic. These tensions are at the heart of this engaging and important book. 
Professor Sagers uses the 2012 antitrust prosecution against Apple and the 
major book publishers as the catalyst for his exegesis on competition. The 
United States Department of Justice (along with the attorneys-general of 
several states) alleged that Apple and the book publishers had conspired to 
raise the price of e-Books, violating the Sherman Act’s prohibition against 
restraints of trade. While the publishers settled, Apple proceeded to trial where 
the district court ruled in favor of the government.1  According to Judge 
Denise Cole, Apple had orchestrated a conspiracy among publishers to 
implement a set of contractual terms in its agreements with authors that would 
raise the price of e-Books. These terms were a per se violation of the Sherman 
Act. 
The Second Circuit affirmed in a 2-1 decision whose rationale was divided.2 
Judge Debra Ann Livingston, writing for the majority, found Apple liable 
under a rule of reason analysis, which entails a balancing of anticompetitive 
and procompetitive effects. Judge Raymond Lohier concurred with the result 
and the factual findings but would have affirmed on the district court’s per se 
ruling. Finally, Judge Dennis Jacobs dissented, reasoning that Apple had acted 
pro-competitively and therefore did not violate the Sherman Act.  
Professor Sagers provides context for these various judicial decisions for those 
not fully familiar with antitrust doctrines. Standards for liability, whether rule 
of reason or per se, reflect compromises over interpretations of the phrase 
“restraint of trade,” starting with Judge Taft’s famous decision in Addyston 
Pipe & Steel on illegal and ancillary restraints.3 Economic justification for 
these standards developed through economic thinking in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Professor Sagers presents these economic developments in 
great and, for some, familiar detail. His presentation is relatively clear and 
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accurate while being critical of some of the underlying assumptions. There is a 
lot to be said about how economics translates into law and policy, and the 
book suggests some of the problems. Professor Sagers alludes to the 
limitations in a brief discussion of the German Historical School in the late 
nineteenth century. Some readers may be disappointed by this attention, short 
relative to the pages devoted to the more well-known marginalist analysis. 
But, as I suggest below, what the book may lack in theoretical discussion is 
compensated for in some very engaging institutional and historical discussion 
of the publishing industry. 
In focusing on marginalist economic theory, with its emphasis on the 
centrality of price as determined by free markets, Professor Sagers highlights 
limitations in our understanding of competition. Antitrust economics relies on 
the mantra of voluntary transactions negotiated through price among many 
actors on the seller and buyer sides of the market. These transactions translate 
into marginalist terms of utility, revenue, and cost, which in turn imply the 
benefits of competition, quality products provided at affordable prices. These 
idealized transactions are abstracted from real world business decisions and 
market dynamics. Competition’s virtues are gauged by results; if prices are 
low, competition is functioning. 
The Apple litigation shows why this abstracted view of competition is limiting 
and misleading. Apple and the publishers sought to counter the perceived 
threat from Amazon, a company that was selling inexpensive e-books while 
limiting compensation for authors. By agreeing not to sell e-books below a set 
price, the practice termed “minimum resale price maintenance”, the publishers 
and Apple were seeking to promote competition in publishing by supporting 
authors and bringing quality new books to readers. Contrary to these 
competitive goals, the Second Circuit, applying antitrust law, focused on the 
increased prices by Apple and competitive virtues of Amazon, namely lower 
prices for consumers. Consequently, Apple’s agreement with the publishers 
must violate the Sherman Act, the Court reasoned. 
Professor Sagers dissects the Second Circuit’s logic by pointing to 
contemporary public attitudes about Amazon, markets, and competition. 
Consumer purchases attest to Amazon’s popularity. At the same time, there is 
a wariness, perhaps more among some antitrust theorists than among 
consumers, about Amazon’s ubiquity in the marketplace. The company’s size 
raises concerns about its dominance and its possible anticompetitive practices. 
These concerns in turn reflect doubts over markets and economic theories of 
competition as benefitting consumers. Instead, public perception is that 
markets lead to scaling up and size to the detriment of consumers despite the 
dubious predictions of marginalist economics. Apple’s agreement with 
publishers is a competitive response to the anticompetitive conduct of 
Amazon. Its low prices do not result from Amazon’s competitive superiority 
but from predatory conduct, a rapacious form of competition. 
Conflicting public attitudes towards competition belie assessments of United 
States v. Apple. Society appreciates competition but deplores competitiveness. 
There is the Greek ideal of agon, which is the competition of the sports field 
and of battle that stems from an internal conflict among ambition, aspiration, 
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and discontent. But there is the reality of greed, selfishness, and rivalry. What 
Professor Sagers reveals, at least to me, is how the ambiguous appeal of 
competition leads to confusion within antitrust law as to means and ends. 
Antitrust law may not know its goals or how to reach them. 
But from this disconcerting message, to be fair perhaps only Professor Sagers’ 
subtext, grows some constructive messages. The best part of this book is the 
detailed history of the publishing industry in the United States. Some of the 
details are familiar, but most demonstrate a valuable integration of 
institutional and economic analysis. Professor Sagers teaches us about actual 
business practices but provides an effective theoretical explanation for why 
these practices were adopted and their implications for publishers, authors, and 
readers. This portion of the book makes up for the scant attention to the 
German Historical approach to economics, mentioned too briefly. The slight is 
made up for by illustration. Professor Sagers’ discussion of book publishing 
shows the German Historical School in action, and the illustration brings to 
life the competition in the book market with its dysfunctions. I was reminded 
of a forthcoming book chapter by Professor Robert Spoo on the tacit 
agreement regarding the publication of James Joyce’s poems among US book 
publishers in the early Twentieth Century.4  Both Professors Sagers and Spoo 
are exemplars of how to communicate about specific markets and business 
practices in nuanced and insightful ways. 
Within antitrust law, all competitive markets are the same while 
anticompetitive markets are different in their own ways. It is the differences 
that are hard to respond to. The appeal of marginalist economic analysis in 
antitrust law is how amenable it is to rule-like application. A per se rule 
against price fixing follows from the theoretical benefits of price competition. 
Rule of reason rests on careful analyses of pricing, marginal costs, and 
deadweight loss, each of which can be diagrammed and statistically discerned.  
By contrast, an historical analysis is open ended without a clear “ought” to 
guide legal decision making.  I finished Professor Sagers book with a mixed 
feeling of enjoyment and doubt.  The Apple litigation reflects some deep 
confusions within antitrust law. But what, short of a wholesale rewrite of 
history, including doctrines, statutes, and treatises, can provide a cure? 
Professor Sagers wants to expand the normative criteria that currently inform 
antitrust analysis. For example, he discusses how the Second Circuit should 
have considered benefits to authors from the Apple agreements. Such benefits 
would be excluded from current antitrust analysis which focuses exclusively 
on benefits to consumers from reduced prices. In addition, Professor Sagers 
argues that the court failed to consider the importance of book publishing to 
developing a literary culture, an ambition not countenanced within marginalist 
economic analysis. These broader normative concerns with non-consumer 
interests and cultural values are arguably more consistent with historical and 
institutional analyses of markets.  Although Professor Sagers touches upon 
these points, further elaboration, perhaps in subsequent scholarship, would be 
welcome.  
But there is a certain degree of ad hocness to normative considerations. The 
alignment between current antitrust law and marginalist economic analysis 
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may be resistant to change. There is an iron logic to the connection, made 
stronger by strains of conservative and liberal politics in the United States. 
This rigidity goes beyond the Apple case, surfacing in labels of hipster 
antitrust, merger decisions that increase market concentration, and debates 
over how antitrust authorities should deal with the tech sector. Professor 
Sagers ignores the politics splitting antitrust law, preferring the abstraction of 
“popular attitudes.”  Avoiding an analysis of politics is understandable given 
the illusion of neutrality within legal methodology.  Professor Jonathan 
Baker’s recent book on antitrust attempts to engage with the perilous political 
issues while extolling the traditional emphasis on economic efficiency.5 
Antitrust politics summon the ghost of Thurman Arnold, a prominent antitrust 
enforcer and scholar whom Professor Sagers does cite, as does Professor 
Baker. But neither embraces Arnold’s whole-hearted commitment to the 
practical realities of antitrust enforcement, perhaps because Arnold seems to 
have ended his career disillusioned.6 
Professor Sagers has written an ambitious book.  Do not be fooled by his 
emphasis on a single case. His sights are much broader, as his scholarship 
engages in healthy competition with many academics and practitioners 
struggling over antitrust’s present and future by grappling with its past. Active 
thinkers in antitrust, intellectual property, business law, and innovation policy 
will finish reading this book enriched.  Professor Sagers’ own agonistic 
interaction with the law teaches us about competition, its ambiguities, and its 
elusiveness for antitrust law. 
 
ENDNOTES 
                                                          
1 United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (SDNY 2012). 
2 United States v. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir 2015). 
3 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6ht Cir 1898), 
affirmed 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
4 Robert Spoo, The Lawful Piracy of James Joyce’s Poems in Shubha Ghosh, 
ed., Forgotten Comparative Intellectual Property Lore (forthcoming 2020).  
5 Jonathan Baker, The Antitrust Paradigm: Restoring a Competitive Economy 
(2019).  See my review at 
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2019/05/shubha-ghosh-
on-the-antitrust-paradigm-restoring-a-competitive-economy.html 
6 See Spencer Weber Waller, Thurman Arnold: A Biography (2005). 
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UNITED STATES V. APPLE: COMPETITION IN AMERICA, by Chris 
Sagers. Harvard University Press, 2019. Pp. 336, Hardcover, $29.95. 
 
A Reply to Shubha Ghosh  
 
By Chris Sagers1 
 
I was glad to read Shubha Ghosh’s generous review of my book on the Apple 
eBooks litigation, and happy to write this response, which I hope will clarify a 
few things. I was pleased by his characterization of the book’s breadth, as its 
philosophical aims go pretty far beyond the one lawsuit it uses as a case study. 
I was also glad for the book to be reviewed for IP readers, because innovation 
always seemed like such an important part of the story, and I was glad that he 
liked my history of American publishing. I very much appreciate his 
recommendation of the book to other readers.  
My need is much less to dispute his views or rebut criticisms, than just to 
clarify some ways that I think he mistook me. He seems to have 
misunderstood my point of view in a fundamental way. The fault is probably 
mine for not explaining myself better, but without understanding these issues, 
assessments of the book will be pretty misleading or inapt. 
Professor Ghosh states what I take to be his own view that antitrust should not 
focus single-mindedly on prices. “The Apple litigation,” he says, “shows why 
[an] abstracted view of competition” preoccupied with prices “is limiting and 
misleading.” That sort of thing is now a standard criticism of antitrust and the 
conservative ideology that has made it what it’s come to be. Other social 
values are at stake, the argument goes. In a case like Apple, they include the 
interests of authors, independent booksellers, literary culture, and more, all of 
which could be imperiled by a preoccupation with price competition alone. 
He’s entitled to his own opinion, but the problem is that he seems to think I 
share it. I was troubled enough by that that I re-read the entire book to see how 
fairly I could be taken that way. I’ll take the blame, I suppose, and I chalk it up 
to the effort I made to be fair to conflicting views in the fraught, complex, 
long-fought struggle over issues of competition and social values. If you spend 
too much time trying to give each argument its due, you risk your own view 
getting lost in the mix. In any case, I cannot stress enough how much 
Professor Ghosh has mistaken me, and a lesson for this author in future will be 
to cut to the chase a little more quickly and with less caution. 
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Professor Ghosh apparently took the book to argue that Apple was wrongly 
decided, or at least poorly reasoned, for not considering values other than low 
retail prices. He thinks I “want[] to expand the normative criteria that currently 
inform antitrust analysis,” and to “dissect[] the Second Circuit’s logic,” 
because the court “should have considered benefits to authors from the Apple 
agreements” or “the importance of book publishing to developing a literary 
culture.” I guess he thought I included brief digressions on German historicism 
and the early American Institutionalists to demonstrate how I think antitrust 
should be done: that in individual cases, we may need to conduct in-depth, 
particularized histories of the markets in question, to see if anything about 
them requires special legal treatment. We can’t just ask whether given conduct 
caused prices to go up or down and decide on that basis whether it was 
desirable or not. He does not really say this explicitly, but as a practical 
matter, if we take that approach we imply that some markets are not suited to 
vigorous price competition, and as far as antitrust policy goes, the only reason 
to imply it is one specific policy prescription. If there really are markets like 
that, then maybe firms within them should be allowed to engage in things that 
antitrust would otherwise make illegal. If price competition itself can 
sometimes imperil important social values, then firms should be permitted to 
dampen that competition with trade-restraining contracts, exclusion of 
competitors, or market-concentrating mergers. So far as I can tell, Professor 
Ghosh took me to argue that this is how we should do antitrust. 
My point is diametrically, emphatically, overwhelmingly the opposite. The 
whole reason for writing the book was to argue the opposite. Its driving force 
is that we should generalize, with simplified legal rules, and we should not try 
to make allowances for idiosyncrasies that might suit particular markets poorly 
to price competition. The book argues that, despite how things may 
superficially seem, idiosyncrasies don’t create special cases, hardly ever. 
Notwithstanding the lamentations of every defendant who ever set foot in 
court, few markets are actually special in antitrust-relevant respects. The 
problem is not that some markets are special, but that all competition is painful 
when it works as it’s supposed to, but it’s still the system we’ve got and we 
don’t get better results by restraining it. I’ve studied such things a lot in prior 
work, including in a few whole books and several articles asking whether the 
dozens of exemptions we’ve had over the life of antitrust, designed to address 
purportedly special market circumstances, were really justified. The 
overwhelming evidence is that they were not.2 So not only do I not think the 
Apple opinion was wrong or poorly reasoned. I think the prevailing caselaw 
identifies its normative criteria in a way that is pretty okay, so long as “price” 
competition is understood the way I think it should be. A preoccupation with 
prices seems bad only if “price competition” is understood according to the 
caricature favored by some conservatives and by their left-leaning critics. 
Professor Ghosh repeats that caricature here in his own criticism of 
mainstream antitrust.3 Instead, price competition means comparatively 
numerous, autonomous units vying non-cooperatively for the same customers, 
on the basis of quality-adjusted price. Accordingly, I think that simple, pro-
enforcement antitrust rules, applied pretty generally and across the board, are 
the way to go. 
The IP Law Book Review 17 
 
In other words, the problem in antitrust is not that the law fails to account for 
non-price values, as was alleged by the many critics of the Apple eBooks 
litigation. It is that the broader public fails to appreciate why and how 
thoroughly the law doesn’t have to.  
I should clarify one point of technical antitrust doctrine. While I believe in 
price competition, and, like Hovenkamp, take it that in antitrust we are mostly 
marginalists now,4 none of this means that courts should actually measure 
prices. This actually reflects a point of common confusion. Antitrust courts in 
fact almost never do that. Except in certain narrow circumstances, antitrust is a 
tort-style law enforcement regime that measures conduct and not prices, and 
that’s how I want it.5 It’s just that I think that those conduct rules must be 
designed to encourage vigorous competition on the basis of quality-adjusted 
price, meaning that it should bar trade-restraining conspiracy, unilateral 
exclusion, and merger that generates concentration or strategic advantage. 
Defendants don’t then need the opportunity to turn cases into graduate social-
science seminars, à la institutionalism or historicism, because what we find on 
extended consideration is that their markets never really need the special 
clemency they think they’ve got coming. Publishing is just another in a 
centuries long series of examples proving it. 
And so, ironically enough, the reason I included the part of the book that 
Professor Ghosh liked best—several chapters on the history of American 
publishing—was the opposite of defending case-specific institutionalism. I 
should probably have been much more clear about that too. My point was to 
show that if we just go ahead and do what institutionalist critics want, and 
look at particular cases with in-depth care, we won’t actually get different 
results than theoretical abstraction would lead you to expect. I said, in effect, 
“fine, let’s have a look. As I predicted before we even started arguing, we will 
find that the behavior, motivations, and outcomes are pretty much what price 
theory would have predicted.” For as long as there has been publishing, 
publishers have argued that they cannot cope with price competition, and as 
long as there has been an independent bookselling sector, both publishers and 
booksellers have argued that maverick retailers must be constrained, or else 
the sky will fall. Since at least the early 19th century, they’ve been organizing 
price cartels with both horizontal and vertical components, largely 
indistinguishable from the eBooks conspiracy of 2010-2012. Those 
conspiracies have usually been initiated and coordinated from downstream, as 
one expects in RPM arrangements meant to enforce retail collusion. And in 
that history, the publishers and booksellers have provided a nice little natural 
experiment. British bookselling was governed by a legalized, industry-wide 
RPM consortium for nearly the entire twentieth century, but American 
bookselling never was, and both had comparable experiences.  
So when Amazon introduced a radically price-cutting innovation in 
bookselling in 2007—almost single-handedly creating the new eBooks sector 
and selling new-releases for a third of their hard-cover price—the industry 
complained that they needed collusion to constrain very novel, technologically 
unprecedented circumstances. But they were lying. They dealt with an old 
problem in the same way they’d done for 200 years. 
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Anyway, I then did what I would think any good institutionalist would 
demand, and attempted to generalize this observation with case-specific 
comparisons to other industries. And it turns out that cartels with vertical 
components were not unique to publishing and bookselling. They followed 
essentially the same pattern throughout mass retail, all throughout the 19th and 
early 20th centuries. That was the point. It was not that publishing must be 
understood only according to its own idiosyncrasies, or that we actually need 
in-depth historical studies in order to apply the law. It was to prove that we 
don’t need to keep doing them, routinely, every time some defendant says 
their market is special. There has never been a defendant in antitrust that 
didn’t think its market was special, but we just really haven’t found, in the 
hundreds or thousands of times that we’ve given them the benefit of the doubt, 
that they were right. 
Finally, the book clarifies at some length that I don’t think these things 
because markets are magic or because they were sent here for our benefit by 
God. I point out specific ways in which markets do in fact seem problematic, 
and the particular macro and dynamic respects in which they fail us severely. 
But the argument that follows is just a simple point of policy. Those ways in 
which markets fail would not be well addressed by the one policy correction 
that could possibly be relevant to antitrust law: allowing private firms to solve 
them through arrangements that reduce price competition. It hasn’t worked 
when it’s been tried, and it won’t work going forward. Instead, as I say several 
times in the book, we should let competition do what it does well, and solve 
other problems with solutions that could actually address them. Trying to 
address them by restraining market-by-market price competition is treating 
real sickness with the wrong medicine.  
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then “competition is functioning.” That is, low prices are not their own goal, 
unless one understands “price” to mean quality-adjusted price, defines “low” 
to mean “least margin above cost,” and requires that the “prices” that are 
supposed to be “low” in this sense are all prices, and not just end-use retail 
price. Even then, price is only instrumental. The goal of encouraging low 
quality-adjusted price is not to have low prices or to favor retail end-users. It is 
to secure a range of social benefits, which only begin with static allocational 
efficiency. The benefits might also include dynamic innovation, better 
distributional equity, reduction of concentrations of undue political power, and 
so on. 
4 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Progressive Antitrust, 2018 U. Ill. L. Rev. 71, 75. 
5 Antitrust courts directly consider prices actually charged only in challenges 
to price predation under §2, price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman 
Act, or in which the plaintiff attempts to prove market power through direct 
evidence of effects on price or output. Each of those cases is unusual and not 
that often litigated. 
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